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COGNOVIT REVISITED: DUE PROCESS
AND CONFESSION OF JUDGMENT
The fiscal mind has conjured innumerable ways to ensure pay-
ment when faced with debtor default. Perhaps the only limitation on
the imagination of creditors is the conscience of society reflected in its
laws and constitutions. Law must provide a countervailing power, on
the debtor's side, to balance the economic and political power of cred-
itors. Due process attempts this balance by securing to the debtor
the exercise of basic rights before he can be deprived of his property.1
Nonetheless, for due process to be more than just a concept, spe-
cific procedures must be established to give it content.
Today, one of the harshest legal tactics available to the creditor
is the cognovit note.2  Because of its harshness, there is widespread
disagreement whether the cognovit note conforms to the requirements
of due process. Recent decisions, including the Supreme Court cases
of Swarb v. Lennox' and D. H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co.,4 have
stimulated the controversy. This note will evaluate these cases and
will consider whether they provide a countervailing force to the power
and interest of creditors by ensuring to the debtors the rights of due
process.
Cognovit Today-Background to Controversy
Today, two types of confessed judgments are recognized: the
cognovit actionem and the cognovit note. The first is the debtor's
written confession of liability, usually prepared after service of proc-
ess. The written acknowledgment is then admissible in a judicial pro-
ceeding, where judgment is entered.5 Since notice of the action and
the opportunity to litigate are the fundamentals of procedural due
1. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378 (1971).
2. A typical cognovit note might read: "AND FURTHER, I ... do hereby
... authorize and empower any Justice of the Peace in the State of Delaware, or
elsewhere, with or without process, to enter judgment, or any Clerk, Prothonotary or
Attorney of any Court of Record in the State of Delaware, or elsewhere, with or
without process, to appear for me . . . and to confess judgment for the above
amount against me .... " Osmond v. Spence, 327 F. Supp. 1349, 1353 (D. Del.
1971).
3. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
4. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
5. E.g., CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. §§ 1133-35 (West 1972).
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process,6 such a procedure raises no significant due process problems.
This method of confessing judgment without action avoids needless
litigation.
The harshness of confessed judgments arises under the second
form, the cognovit note, which is the subject of recent litigation. This
type of note, incorporated in a contract or other document, attempts
in advance of any legal controversy to authorize (1) the assumption of
in personam jurisdiction over the debtor in case of default and (2)
the entering of judgment without notice and hearing for the amount
confessed. The cognovit note usually consists of three provisions: a
consent to jurisdiction, a waiver of notice and hearing, and a warrant
of attorney authorizing judgment. 7 Upon the slightest default, the cred-
itor, without notifying the debtor that legal action has been initiated,
can have any attorney confess judgment for the debtor in the amount
due.8
Because notice is not required, the states are divided on the social
worth and validity of the cognovit note and the restrictions on its use.
At one extreme are those states which have declared the use of cog-
novit notes unlawful. New Mexico, for example, makes their use a mis-
demeanor.9 Nonetheless, the states that invalidate confession of judg-
ment on warrant of attorney before an action is brought generally al-
6. See In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257, 273 (1948).
7. See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (West Supp. 1972-73).
8. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court described the cognovit note procedure as
follows: "A warrant of attorney authorizing judgment is perhaps the most powerful
and drastic document known to civil law. The signer deprives himself of every defense
and every delay of execution, he waives exemption of personal property from levy
and sale under the exemption laws, he places his cause in the hands of a hostile de-
fender. . . . For that reason the law jealously insists on proof that this helplessness
and impoverishment was voluntarily accepted and consciously assumed." Cutler Corp.
v. Latshaw, 374 Pa. 1, 4-5, 97 A.2d 234, 236 (1953).
The cognovit procedure in Pennsylvania is representative. As explained in the
rules of court, a confession of judgment for money may be entered by the clerk of the
court without the agency of an attorney or the filing of a complaint. The amount
in controversy is that which appears to be due from the face of the instrument. PA.
R. Civ. P. 2951(a) (Supp., 1972). The attorney for the plaintiff may sign the con-
fession of liability as the attorney for the defendant unless a statute or the instrument
provides otherwise. PA. R. Civ. P. 2955(b) (Supp., 1972). The defendant's sole
remedy is a petition to strike or reopen the judgment. However, the petition is re-
quired to state prima facie grounds for relief, PA. R. Civ. P. 2959(b) (Supp., 1972);
and, the defendant waives all defenses and objections not stated in the petition. PA.
R. Civ. P. 2959(c) (Supp., 1972). Throughout this process, the judgment lien re-
mains in force.
9. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 21-9-16, -18 (1970). Other states disallow the use
of cognovits without making their use a misdemeanor. E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 20, § 16,
tit. 62, § 248-49 (1958); Aiuz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 6-629, -639, 44-143 (1956); IND. ANN.
STATS. §§ 2-2904, -2906 (1968); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2A:16-9 (1951).
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low confession after suit is initiated, 0 and most enforce the valid cog-
novit judgments of other states." At the other extreme are states that
allow confession of judgment by cognovit note upon warrant of attor-
ney. 12  Such states, however, usually require that the cognovit note be
self-sustaining, able to stand apart from any related contract, and signed
independently of other contractual provisions.1 3
Two uniform codes further illustrate the dispute over cognovit
notes. The Uniform Commercial Code allows cognovit notes in nego-
tiable instruments when it is a "written agreement executed as a part
of the same transaction . . . 4 On the other hand, the Uniform
Consumer Credit Code specifically voids authorizations to confess judg-
ment in the interest of consumer protection.' 5 As of 1971, however,
only six states had adopted the Uniform Consumer Credit Code. 6
California lies somewhere in the middle in the dispute over cog-
novit notes. Although not voiding such notes and their use, Cali-
fornia has established procedural safeguards which have abolished war-
rant of attorney. Before a court with jurisdiction can enter a judgment
for money due or to become due, the defendant must make a timely
sworn statement, either before or after suit is initiated, consenting to
10. As stated in Ritchey v. Gerard, 48 N.M. 452, 457, 152 P.2d 394, 398
(1944), the purpose of the misdemeanor statute was "to make void the provisions
giving power of attorney with authority to confess judgment on such instruments for
a sum of money to be ascertained in a manner other than by action of the court
upon a hearing after proper service of process."
11. See Carroll v. Gore, 106 Fla. 582, 143 So. 633 (1932) (Illinois cognovit judg-
ment); McDade v. Moynihan, 330 Mass. 437, 115 N.E.2d 372 (1953) (Pennsylvania
cognovit judgment).
There are exceptions. New. York did not enforce a cognovit judgment rendered
in Pennsylvania against a resident of New York because he was not a resident of
Pennsylvania when he signed the cognovit. Baldwin Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Klein,
136 Misc. 752, 240 N.Y.S. 804 (Sup. Ct.), affd 230 App. Div. 830, 244 N.Y.S. 899
(1930); accord, Atlas Credit Corp. v. Erzine, 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303
N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969). See text accompanying notes 47-63 infra.
The general approach, however, is that in the absence of fraud, lack of jurisdic-
tion or statutory prohibition, the courts will enforce a foreign judgment entered on a
cognovit note. Carlton v. Miller, 114 Cal. App. 272, 299 P. 738 (1931); Anderson v.
Reconstruction Finance Corp., 281 Ky. 531, 136 S.W.2d 741 (1940).
12. See, e.g., ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 110, § 50 (1968); OHIo REv. CODE ANN.
§ 2323.13 (Page 1960); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 739 (West 1967); S.D. COMPILED
LAws ANN. § 21-26-1 (1960).
13. See L.B. Foster Co. v. Tri.-W Constr. Co., 409 Pa. 318, 186 A.2d 18 (1962).
14. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 3-119(1) (1972). See Squillante & Con-
galton, Cognovit Notes under the Uniform Commercial Code, 4 UNIFORM COMMER-
CIAL CODE LAw JOURNAL 99 (Fall 1971).
15. UNIFORM CONSUMER CREDrr CODE § 2.415 (1968).
16. 1 CCH CONSUMER CREnrr GUIDE 1 4770 (1972). The states are:
Colorado, Idaho, Indiana, Oklahoma, Utah and Wyoming.
April 1973] 1047
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
judgment. This verified statement must concisely state the facts re-
sulting in the debt, showing that the confessed sum is justly due. 17 The
statement can be signed only by the party personally or by another un-
der a valid power of attorney.' 8
Constitutional Validity: Preliminary Questions
The concern over the constitutional validity of cognovit notes
involves requirements of due process guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment. Despite the wide variation in approaches to cognovit
judgments, there is consensus as to the constitutional minimums re-
quired for a valid judgment. As emphasized in Sniadach v. Family
Finance Co., 9 a judgment depriving a person of property is gener-
ally valid only if the defendant is given notice of the action and the
opportunity to be heard. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has rec-
ognized that these constitutional rights can be waived, although there
is a presumption against such waiver. 20  To overcome this presump-
tion, it must be shown that the waiver was given voluntarily, know-
ingly and with understanding of what is involved. 2
The cognovit procedure poses a challenge to many of the above
constitutional requirements. A threshold question is whether signa-
ture on a cognovit note is alone prima facie evidence that one has
knowingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights to notice of
17. CAL. CODE CIv. PROC. § 1133 (West 1972).
18. As stated in Barnes v. Hilton, 118 Cal. App. 2d 108, 110, 257 P.2d 98,
99-100 (1953): "[Tlhe pertinent code sections require a statement by the defendant,
verified by his oath, and do not permit a statement by an attorney purporting to act
under an unverified or unauthenticated power of attorney contained in a promissory
note. If appellant's argument were upheld, then the provisions of the code sections
here involved could readily be subverted by the simple device of including in any
promissory note a warrant of attorney, whereby any attorney could make the state-
ment in writing, verify it, and confess judgment."
19. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Sniadach held that a wage earner cannot be deprived
of the use of her wages by garnishment without adequate notice and an opportunity
to be heard: "Where the taking of one's property is so obvious, it needs no extended
argument to conclude that absent notice and a prior hearing . . . this prejudgment
garnishment procedure violates the fundamental principles of due process." Id. at 342.
The lack of extended argument by the Court has raised questions as to the further
application of Sniadach. It was the basis of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972),
which invalidated Florida and Pennsylvania prejudgment replevin statutes. See, Note,
Some Implications of Sniadach, 70 COLUM. L. REV. 942 (1970). For a discussion of
Sniadach and its extension in California see, Note, The Demise of Summary Prejudg-
ment Remedies in California, 23 HASTINGS L.J. 489 (1972).
20. Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1971). This case was quoted
with approval in D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972) and Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 82 (1972). As to the presumption against waiver see Aetna
Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389, 393 (1937).
21. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
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action against him and the opportunity to defend his cause. There is
an additional problem of ensuring due process after entry of a valid
cognovit judgment, through an accessible appellate procedure to re-
open or strike the judgment.
Are Cognovits Constitutional?
The Supreme Court of the United States in D. H. Overmyer Co.
v. Frick Co. 22 considered the preliminary question of whether cog-
novit notes were per se violative of the Fourteenth Amendment. Over-
myer, a corporation, defaulted in its payments for equipment manu-
factured and installed by Frick. After again defaulting under a post-
contract payment agreement, both corporations, with counsel present,
replaced the first note with a second note containing a cognovit clause
conforming to Ohio law. Overmyer, claiming a breach of contract
on the part of Frick, stopped payment on the new note. Frick, under
the cognovit provision, caused judgment to be entered on the note with-
out prior notice to Overmyer. Overmyer's motion to vacate the judgment
was denied after a post-judgment hearing. This denial was affirmed
on appeal. Overmyer then appealed to the Supreme Court.23
Overmyer's attack on the cognovit judgment was threefold. First,
Overmyer contended that the judgment was invalid because there was
no personal service, no voluntary appearance by it in Ohio, and no
genuine appearance by an attorney on its behalf.24 The argument was
that voluntary appearance should be determined at the court proceed-
ing and not when the cognovit was signed, and that the resulting ap-
pearance by an attorney did not confer jurisdiction on the court. Sec-
ond, Overmyer alleged that it was "unconstitutional to waive in ad-
vance the right to present a defense in an action on the note" because
of the impossibility of knowing the grounds for suit or defenses avail-
able when signing the cognovit. 25  Finally, although it was conceded
that the Ohio court could reopen the judgment upon proper showing,
Overmyer claimed that this procedure was discretionary and that judg-
ment was not ordinarily disturbed on appeal.20
Justice Blackmun delivered the Court's unanimous opinion. Cit-
ing a much quoted passage from National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v.
Szukhent,27 the Court held that the constitutional rights of notice and
22. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
23. Id.
24. Id. at 183-84. The petitioners invoked Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714, 732
(1878), and the long established principles of in personam jurisdiction. For a dis-
cussion of in personam jurisdiction see, Green, Jurisdictional Reform in California,
21 HASTNGS LJ. 1219 (1970).
25. 405 U.S. at 184.
26. Id.
27. In National Equipment Rental, Ltd. v. Szukhent, 375 U.S. 311 (1964), the
COGNOVIT NOTES 1049April 19731
THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL
hearing prior to civil judgment were subject to waiver.28  Therefore,
a cognovit note in a contract was held not per se violative of the Four-
teenth Amendment.29 The standard to be met was that waiver must
"be voluntary, knowing, and intelligently made," a standard that was
"fully satisfied" in this case.
30
The factual context of the case forced the conclusion that the con-
stitutional minimums for effective waiver had been met. Overmyer, a
corporation, clearly understood and accepted the cognovit note as part
of a negotiated contract. 31 Nevertheless, the Court expressly distin-
guished other fact patterns, such as adhesion contracts, situations in-
Court stated: "[I1t is settled . . . that parties to a contract may agree in advance
to submit to the jurisdiction of a given court, to permit notice to be served by the
opposing party, or even to waive notice altogether." Id. at 315-16. This quotation
has been used consistently by courts as precedent for waiver of notice and hearing.
The problem with such use is that this quote, from the majority in Szukhent, is dic-
tum. The case did not involve the waiver of the due process rights to notice and
hearing. In the case, a non-New York resident signed a contract appointing a local
resident, associated with the plaintiff, to receive service of process in the event of a
dispute. The purpose was to ensure for the creditor the jurisdiction of the New York
courts over the debtor. Justice Stewart, finding for the plaintiff on agency principles,
specifically stated that this case did not reach the situation "where no personal notice
has been given the defendant." Id. at 315.
However, the dictum, when the case including the dissents is considered as a
whole, is persuasive of the point that due process rights can be waived. Continued
use, with approval, by the Supreme Court adds to its weight. See, e.g., D.H. Over-
myer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 185 (1972).
The basic question not considered by the majority in Szukhent is the relationship
of waiver of rights to contracts of adhesion. As clearly stated by Justice Black in
his dissent: "This printed form provision buried in a multitude of words is too weak
an imitation of a genuine agreement to be treated as a waiver of so important a
constitutional safeguard as is the right to be sued at home. Waivers of constitutional
rights, to be effective, this court has said, must be deliberately and understandably made
and can be established only by clear, unequivocal, and unambiguous language. [citation
omitted] It strains credulity to suggest that these Michigan farmers ever read this con-
tractural provision about Mrs. Weinberg and about 'accepting service of any process
within the State of New York.'" 375 U.S. at 332.
For further consideration of waiver of jurisdiction in contracts in advance of
lawsuit see Hopson, Cognovit Judgments: An Ignored Problem of Due Process and
Full Faith and Credit, 29 U. Cm. L. REv. 111 (1961); Shuchman, Confession of
Judgment as a Conflict of Laws Problem, 36 NoTRE DAME LAW 461 (1961). For a
consideration of waiver and adhesion contracts, see text accompanying notes 38-46
infra.
28. 405 U.S. at 185-87.
29. Id. at 187-88.
30. Id. at 185. This conclusion of constitutionality was reaffirmed in Swarb v.
Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 200 (1972), where the Court stated that "under appropriate
circumstances, a cognovit debtor may be held effectively and legally to have waived
those rights he would possess if the document he had signed contained no cognovit
provisions."
31. Id. at 186-87.
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volving great disparity in bargaining power between the parties and
instances where the debtor received nothing in return for the cognovit
provision. Such cases might lead to other legal consequences.32 In the
case before it, the Court found no contract of adhesion.33
The Court disposed of Overmyer's first and second arguments in
this manner and then briefly disposed of the third. The post-judg-
ment procedure was held not discretionary because Overmyer did have
an opportunity of a post-judgment hearing under Ohio law.34 Justice
Douglas, in his concurring opinion, more fully considered Overmyer's
claim that the right to challenge a confessed judgment was limited
and required a higher degree of persuasion than is ordinarily imposed
on defendants.3 5  The Ohio Supreme Court had imposed certain safe-
guards on the exercise of the judge's discretion in opening confessed
judgments.36 Justice Douglas considered this a complete answer to the
contention that unbridled discretion governed the disposition of peti-
tions to vacate a cognovit judgment.
Thus, the Court in Overmyer judged that cognovit notes are con-
stitutional where the underlying waiver of due process rights had been
"voluntary, knowing and intelligently made. 31 7  It can then be argued
that, even though a cognovit note may be constitutional on its face, no
waiver of due process rights can withstand attack if the specific fact
pattern involved precludes a voluntary, knowing and intelligent waiver.
These three requirements for effective waiver are arguably in the con-
junctive. Thus a knowing waiver of constitutional rights may not
be voluntary. Also, although a maker may knowingly sign a waiver
of rights, it does not necessarily follow that the individual understands
the full import of his signature.
32. Id. at 188.
33. Id. at 186. The Court reviewed the financial and contractual dealingi
between Overmyer and Frick and found no contract of adhesion, but rather bargaining
between equals represented by counsel. Even though Overmyer could not predict
when Frick would proceed under the cognovit note if Overmyer defaulted, the Court
found that this alone did not mitigate against effective waiver.
34. Id. at 188.
35. Id. at 189-190. Justice Douglas drew a distinction between the Ohio cognovit
procedure and the Pennsylvania system considered in Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191
(1972). By juxtaposing the two procedures, Justice Douglas questioned the validity of
the Pennsylvania post judgment procedure where, in order to vacate a judgment, the
debtor must prove his defense by a preponderance of the evidence rather than merely
pose a jury question as in Ohio. Not only must waiver be effectively rendered, but
the cognovit appeal procedure itself raises constitutional issues if so severe as to result
in the deprivation of property without due process.
36. Livingston v. Rebman, 169 Ohio St. 109, 158 N.E.2d 366 (1959). The
Ohio court held that if there was credible evidence supporting the defense upon
which reasonable men might differ, the court is under a duty to suspend judgment and
permit the issue raised to be litigated.
37. 405 U.S. at 185.
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Overmyer distinguished fact patterns that might lead to the de-
termination that waiver was ineffective as either not knowing, not vol-
untary or not intelligent. Fuentes v. Shevin38 furthered this analysis.
Although primarily concerned with the constitutionality of state re-
plevin procedures and the due process requirement of hearing prior
to repossession,3 9 Fuentes considered the question of what constitutes
effective waiver of due process rights. The defendant creditors at-
tempted to rely on Overmyer to support a clause in a sales contract
which allegedly gave them the right to repossess on buyer's default.
Although it might be argued that Overmyer and Fuentes are distinguish-
able in that physical repossession is a more serious deprivation of prop-
erty than the entry of a judgment lien based on a cognovit note, both
involve the taking of property, bringing into force the due process
rights of notice and hearing. 40 Therefore, Fuentes can be used to clar-
ify Overmyer as to those fact patterns where waiver of due process
rights will be seriously questioned.
The Fuentes Court began by questioning the defendants' use of
Overmyer drawing a distinction between the fact patterns of the two
cases. In Overmyer both parties were aware of the significance of
the cognovit note. However, as to the applicability of Overmyer to the
consumer sales contract before it, the Court stated that:
The facts of the present case are a far cry from those of Overmyer.
There was no bargaining over contractual terms between the par-
ties who, in any event, were far from equal in bargaining power.
The purported waiver provision was a printed part of a form sales
contract and a necessary condition of the sale. The appellees made
no showing whatever that the appellants were actually aware or
made aware of the significance of the fine print now relied upon
as a waiver of constitutional rights.
41
Although the factual context would bear directly on the question of
effective waiver, the Court found no need to consider what legal con-
sequences might be reached if waiver was predicated on an adhesion
38. 407 U.S. 67 (1972).
39. The Court held the Florida and Pennsylvania replevin provisions invalid
under the Fourteenth Amendment as denying due process by allowing repossession
without a prior hearing. 407 U.S. at 80-93. Crucial concerns were raised by
Justice White in his dissent, concerns that must be answered and balanced with the
rights of the individual to notice and hearing prior to the taking of his property. Id.
at 97-103. Justice White argued that one way to protect the antagonistic interests of
buyer and seller is to allow repossession supported by a bond from the seller. The
unyielding requirement of a prior hearing ignores the creditor's interest to protect his
property from further use and deterioration. Id. at 102. Finally and most import-
antly, the requirement of a hearing prior to repossession will probably diminish the
availability of credit or increase the expense of securing it. Id. at 103.
40. Cf., 407 U.S. at 81, relying on Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79
(1971).
41. 407 U.S. at 95.
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contract or great disparity in bargaining power. The contract at is-
sue merely stated that the seller "may take back" the goods involved.4"
This did not satisfy the Court's requirement that "a waiver of consti-
tutional rights in any context must, at the very least, be clear."43  Ef-
fective waiver was impossible because the self-help provision was vague
and uncertain.
By inference from the manner in which Overmyer and Fuentes dis-
tinguished fact patterns, it can be argued that these cases give content
to the requirement that an effective waiver must arise from a con-
tractual setting which will support a finding that the waiver was know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily rendered. A factual determination
that the wording of a cognovit note was unclear or uncertain, or that
the cognovit was buried in a lengthy and complicated contract, would
probably negate waiver as not being knowing.44 Depending on the
buyer's education and business experience, technical language could af-
fect the requirement that waiver be intelligently given. 5 Relative bar-
gaining power must also be considered. Arguably, if there is great dis-
parity in bargaining power between the parties, the product involved
is a necessity, the cognovit is a prerequisite for sale, and the con-
sumer has no alternative; waiver can be considered involuntary even
if knowingly and intelligently made.40 Therefore, these cases lead to
the conclusion that, at least in ultimate consumer sales contracts, a
heavy burden is placed on the creditor to establish effective waiver
of due process rights.
The major question, however, still remains to be answered. Given
a cognovit note in a contract, a court is faced with two alternatives.
It may assume effective waiver and debate this assumption after judg-
ment is entered or it may require a prior hearing. The question is
which approach conforms to the requirements of due process. Overmyer
involved the rather special circumstances of corporations signing cog-
novits with the advice and consent of counsel. In such cases, a signa-
ture on a cognovit note does reasonably represent a knowing, intelli-
gent and voluntary waiver of rights. On the other hand, the signature
of the average consumer, even in true bargaining situations, does not
persuasively demonstrate that the cognovit note was read and under-
stood. Thus, the problem confronting the court is largely one of
proof: (1) whether the debtor's signature on a cognovit note is the
42. Id. at 94.
43. Id. at 95.
44. Cf., Carson v. Saito, 53 Hawaii 178, 489 P.2d 636 (1971); Peoples Mort-
gage Co. v. Vista View Builders, 6 Wash. App. 744, 496 P.2d 354 (1972). See the
discussion of Justice Black's dissent in Szukbent, note 27 supra.
45. Cf., Bauer v. Jackson, 15 Cal. App. 3d 358, 93 Cal. Rptr. 43 (1971).
46. Cf. United States v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 315 U.S. 289, 299-304 (1942);
Laemmar v. J. Walter Thompson Co., 435 F.2d 680 (7th Cir. 1970).
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equivalent of voluntary, intelligent and knowing waiver, and, if not,
(2) what guidelines determine when a cognovit signature will be hon-
ored, and (3) when is this determination to be made by the court.
Determining Effective Waiver
Several recent cases have offered solutions to the problem of de-
termining effective waiver of due process rights prior to entering judg-
ment against an absent defendant. In Atlas Credit Corp. v. Erzine,"7
the plaintiff brought suit in New York to enforce two Pennsylvania
judgments obtained under a warrant of attorney. Justice Breitel of
the New York Court of Appeals found Pennsylvania's cognovit pro-
cedure unenforceable in New York on two separate grounds. First, the
court held that the proceeding of entering a cognovit judgment before
the clerk of a court was purely ministerial, lacking the discretion or
judgment associated with judicial proceeding. Consequently, the court
argued that such judgments were not the result of a judicial proceeding
within the meaning of the full faith and credit clause.48 Comity there-
fore could be the only basis for enforcement of the Pennsylvania judg-
ments, and comity was not to be extended here because unrestricted
cognovits were repugnant to New York policy.4 9
In denying the Pennsylvania procedure the status of judgment
and by concluding that it was not entitled to full faith and credit, the
New York court formulated an unacceptable definition of the type of
judgment entitled to full faith and credit. According to Atlas, those
judgments or judicial acts entitled to full faith and credit involve judi-
cial discretion in resolving controversies or matters submitted to the
court.5" It might be argued, in the extreme, that such reasoning pre-
cludes the extension of full faith and credit to any in personam ad-
judication, valid and binding under the laws of a sister state, unless
judgment is entered after a trial in which both sides contest the case.
Thus, judgments by default and judgments by consent would not be
entitled to full faith and credit for there is no exercise of judicial dis-
cretion or judgment in the sense of deciding between alternatives.
Such judgments can also be considered, as Atlas considered cognovit
judgments, merely "the court's imprimatur on a purely personal act."51
Further, the Atlas court's definition of judicial proceeding as excluding
cognovit judgments from full faith and credit is in contravention of sub-
stantial precedent,52 and contrary to the opinion of numerous legal
47. 25 N.Y.2d 219, 250 N.E.2d 474, 303 N.Y.S.2d 382 (1969).




52. See the dissent in Atlas for New York cases holding foreign cognovit judg-
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The second reason given by the Atlas court for nonenforcement
was that the Pennsylvania court lacked jurisdiction. Citing Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co.,54 the New York court observed
that even though notice and hearing could be waived, due process re-
quires certain minimums based on the concept of reasonableness, and
that "one minimal procedural guarantee should be that a person can-
not consent to the entry of judgment against him anywhere without
service of process."5 5 This argument is noteworthy.
The Atlas court acknowledged that Mullane was concerned pri-
marily with the requirement of reasonable notice and the substitute
that is most likely to reach the beneficiaries of a trust in a judicial set-
tlement of accounts.5" Nonetheless, by inference Mullane suggests that
the entire concept of due process requires certain minimums based on
reasonableness. Since due process requires both notice and hearing,
each element must be granted within certain minimums. Although
Szukhent stated that notice can be waived altogether, 57 it does not
stand for the proposition that the opportunity to be heard can be
waived altogether. The holding of Szukhent should not be construed
to effectively preclude a defendant from challenging a judgment
through whatever post-judgment procedures are available to him.
Szukhent spoke in terms of agreeing "in advance to submit to the ju-
risdiction of a given court. . . ,,51 Clearly the concern of the Atlas
court was the spectre of a defendant having to protect his rights thou-
sands of miles from his home or the situs of the contract. The court
concluded that:
[A] warrant of attorney which permits entry of a judgment by
confession anywhere in the world without notice violates due proc-
ess and deprives the rendering court of jurisdiction. Any judgment
entered thereon whether against New York residents or others,
ments entitled to full faith and credit. 25 N.Y.2d at 233, 250 N.E.2d at 483, 303
N.Y.S.2d at 394. See 45 N.Y.U.L. REv. 367, 368 nn.10 & 11 (1970) for an ex-
tensive listing of precedents.
53. Note, Cognovit Judgments: Some Constitutional Considerations, 70 CoLUM.
L. REv. 1118 (1970); Note, Conflict of Laws-Cognovit Judgments, 45 N.Y.U.L.
REv. 367 (1970); Note, The Effect of Full Faith land Credit on Cognovit ludgments,
42 U. COLO. L Rnv. 173 (1970).
54. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
55. 25 N.Y.2d at 232, 250 N.E.2d at 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
56. McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90, 92 (1917). Mullane expanded upon this
case and declared that "when notice is a person's due, process which is a mere gesture
is not due process." 339 U.S. 306, 315 (1950). See also Schroeder v. City of New
York, 371 U.S. 208 (1962); Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956);
Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
57. See note 27 supra.
58. 375 U.S. at 316 (emphasis added).
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although enforced by the rendering State, may not be recognized
or enforced in the courts of this State. 59
Those who seek to enforce cognovit judgments might argue that
since the right to counsel6" can be waived in a criminal action where
personal liberty is involved, a waiver of the right to present a civil
defense in an individual's immediate locality is not inherently unrea-
sonable. Further, if notice can be waived altogether, a hearing has
no meaning for a defendant. The reason for a cognovit is the entry
of judgment without the presence of the defendant. Since the defend-
ant has not been informed of a pending action, it makes no difference,
apart from social policy, that he is not present to defend in New York
or San Francisco.6  There is, however, a difference. This difference
is the ability of the defendant to challenge the entry of judgment or the
entered judgment on the grounds of invalid waiver. The only way
that a defense can be assumed to be meaningless is if the defendant has
in fact validly waived the right to defend 62 Such an assumption runs
counter to any elemental concept of due process which would not tol-
erate the forcing of a defendant to pay the expense of asserting, at the
opposite end of the country, that he never waived his rights to notice
and hearing. Nonetheless, the Atlas court went beyond this conclusion.
The court inferred that, even assuming effective waiver, any procedure
which allows the plaintiff to pick any forum in which to sue the de-
fendant is not in accord with fundamental principles of justice and fair
play and does not comply with the modem theory of due process. 3
Thus, the validity of the Atlas position rests on the premise that
waiver is ineffective if so broad or unconscionable as to go beyond
the reasonable parameters of due process. If waiver is too broad,
a court lacks jurisdiction to enter judgment on a cognovit note. Atlas,
however, did not address the question of effective waiver and is, there-
fore, of little assistance in solving the problem of how and when a court
is to determine whether an alleged waiver of due process rights is valid.
Declaring waivers of a certain type a priori ineffective avoids the is-
sue. Yet this case does provide a useful starting point for a discus-
sion of waiver and due process rights. The case clearly illustrates the
clash between cognovit notes and social policy. The following cases
focus directly on the problem of determining effective waiver.
59. 25 N.Y.2d at 232, 250 N.E.2d at 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
60. E.g., Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 275 (1942).
61. As stated by Chief Judge Fuld in his dissent: "If the debtor has the
capacity to consent to a cognovit judgment and, in effect, waives whatever protection
notice of the proceedings might yield, then, it is difficult to perceive why as a matter of
due process-as distinguished from wise policy-he may do so in only one specific
jurisdiction." 25 N.Y.2d at 235, 250 N.E.2d at 484, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 396.
62. See text accompanying notes 25-33 and notes 83-96.
63. 25 N.Y.2d at 232, 250 N.E.2d at 482, 303 N.Y.S.2d at 393.
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Swarb V. Lennox-Changing Problems
In Swarb v. Lennox,64 seven persons filed suit in the United States
District Court on behalf of a class consisting of all individual and nat-
ural Pennsylvania residents who had signed contracts containing cog-
novit notes that resulted in confessed judgments in Philadelphia
County. The defendants were the county prothonotary and sheriff,
the officials responsible, respectively, for recording and executing the
judgment. The complaint alleged that the Pennsylvania rules and stat-
utes supporting cognovit judgments were unconstitutional on their face
as a denial of due process, that the waiver of notice and hearing was
rarely intelligent and voluntary, and that the debtor's only recourse
(an action to strike or reopen the judgment) was costly and burden-
some to low income consumers. 65
The complaint sought a declaration that the Pennsylvania proce-
dure was unconstitutional and a permanent injunction restraining the
defendants from recording and executing the cognovit judgments. 66 A
hearing before a three judge panel was held. One item of stipulated
evidence was a sociological study entitled Consumers in Trouble. The
study, conducted in 1968, surveyed 245 Philadelphia confessed judg-
ment debtors. The report found that 96 percent of those surveyed had
annual incomes of less than $10,000, only 30 percent had graduated
from high school, and only 14 percent knew that the contracts they
were signing contained cognovit clauses.67  This study was instru-
mental in the decision of the court.
The court held that, as of November 1, 1970, the defendants
were permanently enjoined and restrained from entering cognovit judg-
ments against individual natural persons with annual incomes of less
than $10,000, "unless it has been shown that the signers of such
clauses have intentionally, understandingly, and voluntarily waived all
the rights lost under the Pennsylvania law. .. ."'s The court found
the stipulated evidence and witness testimony sufficient to support a
finding that those earning less than $10,000 annually, as a class, did
not voluntarily, intelligently and intentionally waive their constitutional
rights to notice and hearing when signing a cognovit clause. 69
64. 314 F. Supp. 1091 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
65. Swarb v. Lennox, 405 U.S. 191, 196 (1972).
66. Swarb v. Lennox, 314 F. Supp. 1091, 1093 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
67. Id. at 1097.
68. Id. at 1103.
69. Id. at 1100. Mortgages were excluded because safeguards had been built
into the cognovit procedure to ensure due process. As the court stated: "Confession
of judgment clauses in bonds and warrants of attorney accompanying mortgages are
normally signed at Title Company settlements and notice of execution on the mort-
gaged property must be given by certified mail. . . . [T]here must be affirmatively
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Although the plaintiffs sued on behalf of all cognovit judgment
debtors, the court found the record insufficient to support a finding
that the plaintiffs adequately represented those earning more than
$10,000 annually as required by Federal Rules of Civil Procedure
23(a)(4). 70  Since the action would be binding on all members of the
class and adversely affect their ability to get credit, the class was thus
limited. 71 Finally, the court held that since there was no judicial pro-
cedure for rebutting the finding of effective waiver, the Pennsylvania
practice of confessing judgment violated the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as to the class. 72  Cognovit judgments would
stand only where it could be established that the signers of such con-
tracts effectively waived their rights.7 3  Nevertheless, the court exer-
cised judicial restraint and declined to dictate the specific procedures
which would allow cognovits to be enforced against persons earning
less than $10,000 annually.74 The court did offer Pennsylvania one
suggestion: the development of a "statewide rule or legislation provid-
ing for the filing of proof of intentional, understanding and voluntary
consent to confessed judgments . . . to permit use of the confession
of judgment clause if Pennsylvania decides to continue this system.
75
The class action engendered in this case has serious flaws and cre-
ates more problems than it solves. If the premise is accepted that cog-
novit judgments are constitutional and any violation of due process
resulting from their use is a function of ineffective waiver on the debt-
or's part, there is no question of law or fact common to all plaintiffs
to warrant a class action. The only way to define a class would be
to find that all members of the class could not have effectively waived
their rights. This the court did by accepting the Caplovitz study.
Thus, the validity of this class action rests totally on the validity of a
demographic study of 254 cognovit judgment debtors. That study
found that 86 percent did not know what they were signing, but 14
percent did. Still, 96 percent earned less than $10,000, and this per-
centage was high enough to provide a handle for defining a class.
Nonetheless, the rational nexus between income level and the ability
to effectively waive constitutional rights seems tenuous at best. This
is not the place to debate statistics and sampling methods, except to
say that if Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3) can be com-
called to any home mortgagor's attention the fact that he is subjecting his home to a lien
in signing such bond and warrant of attorney. . . ." Id. at 1098.
70. Id. at 1099.
71. Id.
72. Id. at 1100.
73. Id. at 1100-01.
74. Id. at 1100.
75. Id. at 1100-01 n.24.
1058 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 24
April 19731 COGNOV]T NOTES




If a class action is acceptable at all, the Swarb court improperly
identified a class of individuals earning less than $10,000 annually
rather than a class of all those signing cognovits without requisite
knowledge and intent. The resulting class is underinclusive because it
excludes individuals earning over $10,000 annually who do not effec-
tively waive their rights when signing cognovits. The classification is
also overinclusive for including individuals earning less than $10,000
who are capable of knowing and voluntary waiver, for example, law
students.
Moreover, no matter how valid the Caplovitz study, the under-
lying logic of Swarb is faulty. Waiver is an individual consent, not a
function of income level or class membership. 77  A more logical and
effective approach, accomplishing the same social end, would have
been to reverse the burden of proof, requiring in all cases that the
creditor substantiate valid waiver to the court. This would answer the
social need of securing due process rights to those signing cognovit
notes, regardless of income level, and avoid the creation of an artifi-
cial and perhaps meaningless class distinction as far as consent is con-
cerned. Since the question of waiver is basically individualistic, the
only logical approach is that each case, and the state of mind of each
plaintiff regardless of income, must be considered on its own merits.
Thus, the Swarb court, using annual income to define a class,
secured the rights of notice and hearing for only a subset of the pop-
ulation signing cognovit notes without knowledge and intent. As noted
above, the allowance of a class action in this case was improper. The
definition of the class is also unfortunate since it creates the illusion
that only persons with minimal incomes are entitled to contest the va-
lidity of a waiver provision. Although the exclusion of persons earn-
ing more than $10,000 annually from the class action does not, as a
matter of law, preclude them from separately attacking the validity of
cognovit provisions, there is a danger that Swarb may be construed
76. It is interesting to note that the 245 cognovit judgment debtors samil ed by
the study represent only 2 of 1% of the 50,000 confessions of judgment filed in
Philadelphia County in the year the sample was taken. Note, Swarb v. Lennox: The
Viability of Repeated Judicial Attacks on Confessions of Judgment in Pennsylvania,
34 U. Prrr. L. RPv. 103 (Fall 1972). For a commentary on the use of the social sci-
ences and Swarb, see Schuchman, In Re: Social Science in the Eastern District of
Pennsylvania, United States District Court, Middle District, Nusquamia (Counsel Have
Asked to Remain Anonymous), 32 U. Prrr. L. REv. 463 (1971).
77. As stated in Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1937): "A waiver is
ordinarily an intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known right or privilege.
The determination of whether there has been an intelligent waiver.., must depend,
in each case, upon the particular facts and circumstances surrounding the case...."
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as creating a presumption that a waiver is valid when signed by a
person of wealth. Such a conclusion is warranted by neither justice nor
common sense. As a blast at social injustice, the case serves a pur-
pose. Nevertheless, the problem of how to ensure the rights of due
process for all who sign cognovit notes still remains.
The Supreme Court and Swarb-Post Script
Swarb was appealed to the Supreme Court and decided on Feb-
ruary 24, 1972,' 8 along with the companion case of D. H. Overmyer
Co. v. Frick Co. 79 Citing Overmyer as controlling, the Supreme Court
affirmed the district court's decision. The plaintiffs' contention that
cognovit judgments were unconstitutional on their face was directly
rejected. This affirmance, however, did not mean that the district
court's opinions and judgments were approved as to the other issues
decided below and not before the Court.80 The basic questions of what
constitutes effective waiver of fundamental rights and the validity of
the income classification were not at issue on appeal and not consid-
ered by the Court. Thus, the Supreme Court again refused to declare
cognovit judgments unconstitutional per se. Nevertheless, the Court,
as in Overmyer, added a caveat concerning contracts of adhesion as
perhaps applicable to the Pennsylvania system.8
Osmond V. Spence-An Attempted Answer?
Contrasting favorably with Swarb is the well reasoned opinion
of Osmond v. Spence,8 2 decided in the United States District Court
for Delaware. This case, however, has been vacated and remanded
by the Supreme Court for reconsideration in the light of Over-
myer and Sivarb.83 Although Osmond is no longer binding precedent,
an analysis of the case is useful for the case provides a significant legal
alternative to Swarb. The extent to which Overmyer and Osmond
conflict is open to argument and crucial to resolving the question of
whether a court must determine effective waiver prior to entry of a cog-
78. 405 U.S. 191 (1972).
79. 405 U.S. 174 (1972).
80. 405 U.S. at 200-01. There was no cross appeal by the defendants. The
Pennsylvania attorney general no longer supported the constitutionality of the cog-
novit procedures followed in his state and joined the appellants in urging that the
rules and statutes be held facially invalid. The intervening finance companies were
compelled to argue only the constitutional issue raised by the appellants. Id.
81. 405 U.S. at 201. D.H. Overmyer Co. v. Frick Co., 405 U.S. 174, 188
(1972).
82. 327 F. Supp. 1349 (D. Del. 1971).
83. Osmond v. Spence, 405 U.S. 971 (1972). See text accompanying notes
97-101 infra.
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novit judgment. Before addressing the conflict, Osmond itself must
be considered.
The fact pattern in Osmond is similar to Swarb. The plaintiffs
united to enjoin the selling of their property or the paying over of the
proceeds of the attachment of their wages based on confessed judg-
ments under cognovit notes. Further, the plaintiffs sought to have
declared unconstitutional the Delaware cognovit procedure.8 4  The
court first considered the constitutionality of the Delaware procedure
and then addressed the question of whether a class could maintain
the action. The result was a cogent argument on how to ensure due
process rights for cognovit debtors.
The Delaware practice of entering judgments by confession upon
warrant of attorney was comparable to the Pennsylvania procedure. 85
Osmond, like Swarb, dealt directly with the constitutionality of cogno-
vit judgments and the circumstances under which waiver of due proc-
ess rights could be presumed prior to suit. 6  The court first consid-
ered and then rejected Atlas as not authoritative because of its failure
to address the issue of waiver. The court then analyzed Swarb and
reached the "same substantive result based upon a different rationale."87
Upon reviewing the Delaware procedure, the Osmond court determined
that no court operating within such a procedure could be certain that
waiver based on signature alone had been effectively made. There-
fore, the Delaware cognovit scheme was unconstitutional in all cases
as violative of due process.8  The court concluded:
[T]here is no method of judicially determining whether or not a
particular debtor knowingly and intelligently signed the judgment
note thereby waiving his 14th amendment rights. So that, even
conceding as we do, that there may be a substantial number of
persons . . . bankers, lawyers, sophisticated businessmen . . . who
do sign such notes with a full realization of the legal effect of their
acts, it remains that the Delaware practice furnishes no judicial
means for separating the case of those persons who have know-
ingly and intelligently waived from those who have not.89
84. 327 F. Supp. at 1350.
85. See Id. at 1354-55 and note 8 supra.
86. The court began its opinion by stating that notice and hearing were indeed
rights protected by the constitutional guarantee of due process. 327 F. Supp. at 1355.
Such rights must be safeguarded prior to depriving one of his property. The court re-
lied on Sniadach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969), and held that a suffi-
cient property right for due process protection was involved in this case. The lien
resulting from entry of a cognovit judgment, while not completely depriving the
debtor of the use of his property, seriously restricted his ability to sell or use it as
collateral.
87. 327 F. Supp. at 1357.
88. Id. at 1359.
89. Id.
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Having judged the Delaware procedure unconstitutional, the court
considered whether a class action could be maintained. Even though
the question of waiver clouds all cognovit judgments, the validity of
waiver rests with a determination of whether a given individual know-
ingly, intelligently and voluntarily waived his rights. Using this prem-
ise, the Osmond court decided that a hearing prior to judgment was re-
quired in all cases, on a case by case basis, to determine effective
waiver. The court refused to declare a specific segment of the popu-
lation a priori incapable of giving effective waiver and made the prac-
tical result of the Swarb decision universal. Thus where Swarb and Os-
mond diverge is on the question of class action. Having determined
that the Delaware procedure was unconstitutional, the majority in Os-
mond did not accept the contention that three plaintiffs, who claimed
to have ineffectively waived their rights, could adequately represent
hundreds of debtors, "many of whom, after full hearing based upon
notice, may be found to have waived such rights."90  Although the
concurring opinion would have followed the logic of Swarb and allowed
a class action based on the poverty guidelines of the Office of Economic
Opportunity,9 the majority found no common question of law or fact
sufficient to support a class action.
Although not allowing a class action, the court held for the plain-
tiffs as individuals.2 The standard of inquiry was that "Courts indulge
every reasonable presumption against waiver of a constitutional right
. . .and for a waiver to be effective, it must be clearly established that
there was a deliberate and understanding relinquishment of the right
involved. '93  The court found that the defendants had not demon-
strated that any one of the plaintiffs signed the cognovits in question
with the specific knowledge and intent required to uphold judgment."
Even though Delaware has a procedure for reopening confessed
judgments upon the showing of a meritorious defense,95 under the Os-
mond rationale a cognovit judgment would presumably stand only if
it resulted from a procedure with a built-in mechanism enabling the
court to separate, prior to judgment, the "case of those persons who
90. Id. at 1360.




95. DEL. SUPER. Cr. (Civ.) R. 60. This follows the format of Federal Rule 60.
However, the Delaware rule does not alter the traditional method of attacking con-
fessed judgments. The proceeding to set aside such a judgment is equitable in nature
and follows the principle that if the petitioner affirmatively shows the existence of a
meritorious defense, the judgment will be set aside. Sussex Finance Co. v. Goslee,
46 Del. 242, 82 A.2d 743 (Super. Ct. 1951). The Delaware code sections concerning
cognovit judgments are: DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 10, §§ 2306, 4717, 4732 (1953).
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have knowingly and intelligently waived from those who have not."96
Further, because the court found that the defendants had not demon-
strated effective waiver, the case can be read as shifting the burden
of proof onto the creditor seeking a cognovit judgment. Mere signa-
ture alone will not support a cognovit judgment. Therefore, consid-
ering the absence of the debtor, the creditor would have to substan-
tiate effective waiver with evidence extrinsic to the cognovit note suffi-
cient for the court to evaluate waiver prior to entry of judgment.
Osmond Versus Overmyer
Having considered the holding of Osmond, the question remains
whether this holding conflicts with the Supreme Court's decision in
Overmyer. There are three possible arguments as to why the Supreme
Court vacated Osmond and whether Osmond can stand in the light of
Overmyer. First, it might be argued that there is no conflict, for Os-
mond does not run counter to the decision that cognovits can be con-
stitutionally entered. Overmyer involved the constitutionality of cog-
novit judgments entered upon a valid waiver. Osmond concerned the
constitutional requisite for a procedure to determine effective waiver
prior to entering judgment.
97
Yet, the Supreme Court held that Overmyer had intelligently,
knowingly and voluntarily waived its due process rights and judgment
could be entered on the cognovit. 98 Although the Court did not di-
rectly consider the question of how and when a court determines effec-
tive waiver, by inference there appeared to be no need for a hearing
prior to judgment in Overmyer. Therefore, it might be argued that
Overmyer stands for the proposition that certain cognovit judgments,
arising out of certain factual contexts, can be entered on signature
alone. The only requirement would be that the debtor be given the
opportunity to vacate the judgment by showing a valid defense in a
post-judgment hearing. 99 Overmyer can then, perhaps, be limited to
corporations negotiating with counsel, and Osmond can stand for the
general proposition that in all other cases and factual situations a pre-
judgment hearing on the issue of effective waiver is required by due
process.
Nonetheless, it is illogical to argue that Overmyer can be suffi-
ciently narrowed to allow Osmond to stand. Granting that Overmyer dis-
tinguished other fact patterns while holding the specific cognovit judg-
ment before it valid, the allusion to other possible legal consequences'"0
96. 327 F. Supp. at 1359.
97. Id.
98. 405 U.S. at 187-88.
99. Id.
100. See text accompanying notes 27-33 and 40-45 supra.
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was addressed to the outcome of an appellate review of an entered
cognovit judgment and not to any need for a prior hearing. Further,
any effort to narrow Overmyer overlooks the holding of Osmond. How
is a court to determine that the corporations were negotiating from
relatively equal strength and with the aid of counsel prior to judgment
unless such facts are presented to it? Osmond said that a court can
not so determine and Overmyer stands for the proposition that there
is no need to so determine if a post-judgment hearing is available.
Therefore, the two cases do substantially conflict. The conflict is not
as to what constitutes an effective waiver of constitutional rights. Both
agree that such waiver must be intelligent, knowing and voluntary. 1'
The conflict involves whether a court must determine effective waiver
prior to or after entry of judgment on a cognovit note. Osmond
stands for the proposition that, since a cognovit judgment deprives
the debtor of property, such judgments cannot be entered unless ef-
fective waiver of notice and hearing has been judicially determined.
Overmyer, on the other hand, seems to stand for the proposition that
signature alone will support a congovit judgment if the debtor subse-
quently has the opportunity to attack the validity of the cognovit judg-
ment.
Perhaps the real conflict between Overmyer and Osmond is the clash
of social policies and the ranking of social priorities. Osmond stresses
the importance of due process rights, the strong presumption against
waiver of constitutional rights and the need for a procedure to protect
the debtor. Overmyer has a great set of facts as a stage for empha-
sizing the fact that due process rights are subject to waiver, and not
for emphasizing the presumption against waiver. As stated by Justice
Blackmun, the facts in Overmyer "amply demonstrate that a cognovit
provision may well serve a proper and useful purpose in the commer-
cial world and at the same time not be vulnerable to constitutional
attack."10
The effect of the Osmond reversal is to show that judgments can
be entered perfunctorily on cognovit notes. Signature alone is suffi-
cient to warrant entry and carries a presumption of valid waiver of due
process rights. The only procedural requirement is that there be an
appellate review for reopening or vacating the judgment. It is in the
appellate procedure that a court, if so requested, must determine the
validity of the alleged waiver of the due process rights to notice and
hearing.
Conclusion
The cases considered clearly state that cognovit judgments are
alive and well. They have withstood attacks under the due process
101. Compare id. with 327 F. Supp. 1358-59.
102. 405 U.S. at 188.
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clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Even though a property inter-
est sufficient to warrant notice and hearing is involved, the judicial pol-
icy reflected in Sniadach and Fuentes has not been extended to cogno-
vit judgments. Due process rights can be waived and cognovit judg-
ments can be entered if waiver is evident from the contract containing
the cognovit note.
Overmyer indicates that the Fourteenth Amendment is almost cer-
tainly satisfied if there is an appellate procedure conforming to the
requirements of due process. The review procedure must not be so
arbitrary as to preclude the reopening of a cognovit judgment if valid
defenses are presented. Justice Douglas suggested the guidelines that
a judgment should be reopened if reasonable men would differ as to the
validity of the judgment.10 3 The opportunity for review is a sufficient
due process protection of property to allow entry of judgment on a cog-
novit note.
Although the Supreme Court refused to require a prior hearing
in cognovit cases, the cases considered provide guidelines for deter-
mining effective waiver in appellate review. Perhaps it can be argued
that the use of cognovit notes in retail sales transactions is severely
constrained. Atlas considered a limit as to what, in fact, can be
waived through a congovit note."' A waiver that places the buyer
at too great a disadvantage, for example, to defend anywhere, may be
disallowed even if effectively rendered, under the premise that due
process demands reasonableness.
Apart from the scope of the waiver considered by Atlas, a combi-
nation of the Overmyer and Fuentes lines of cases preclude the use of
cognovits in certain factual situations. It is arguable from these cases
that waiver of notice and hearing should be disallowed if the contract
language is unclear, misleading or concealed in a complex document.
Complete disclosure by the seller is mandated. Lack of clarity goes
directly to the requirement that waiver be knowing and voluntary.
Even if the language is self-evident, it can be argued by inference that
the cases preclude the use of cognovit notes in transactions where there
is a great disparity in bargaining power between the parties. Even if
a consumer knowingly signs a contract containing a coguovit, if the
transaction involves a necessity and the consumer is without alterna-
tive, the waiver can be attacked as involuntary. This conclusion is con-
sistent with the statement in Adams v. Egley, 'Where . . . the parties
are both commercial entities, the bargaining power is to some degree
equalized, and the purported waiver of the constitutional right to prior
notice and hearing may indeed be effective.' 0 5
103. See text accompanying notes 35-36 supra.
104. See text accompanying notes 47-63 supra.
105. 338 F. Supp. 614, 621 (1972) (dictum).
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Thus, if a creditor manages to find a state that allows cognovits,
he would be wise to refrain from a heavy-handed use of cognovit notes
in retail credit sales. The courts will probably employ traditional doc-
trines of fairness and void waivers of due process rights in certain fac-
tual contexts. Yet if the waiver clause is explicit and the contract not
one of adhesion, the cognovit judgment will probably stand.
The final question, for which there is no answer, is whether Over-
myer, and the decision that there is no requirement for a hearing prior
to entry of a cognovit judgment, is sound social policy. On one side is
the right of the creditor to protect his interest and avoid economic
loss. If prior hearing were universally required, it would probably be
more difficult for the buyer to obtain credit. Higher interest rates and
loans secured other than by the item purchased may be required. Per-
haps the end result will be that the poor in general will pay higher
prices to support among themselves the creditor's greater judicial bur-
den and economic risk.
Nonetheless, by not requiring hearing in cognovit cases, the debtor
is put at an unjust disadvantage. With a judgment lien in effect, the
debtor will probably give in under pressure rather than defend his
rights. Courts, law, lawyers and the resulting expense have a debili-
tating effect on the debtor's willingness to assert his rights-especially
if all that is involved is a television. Even if he has a valid defense
or the alleged waiver was not given, the debtor sees a fait accompli
and the burden of taking the initiative to assert his claim.
Yet the possible intimidation of the debtor must be weighed
against the freedom to contact and the need to avoid unnecessary liti-
gation. It can be argued that the duty of the courts is to provide an
impartial, neutral forum. Their function is not to demand litigation
in every dispute. Since waiver of due process rights can be made, the
courts' function is to provide a forum for attacking the validity of
waiver if, but only if, the debtor wants to challenge it.
Perhaps, in the final analysis, the balance between debtor and
creditor, although always in flux, has swung as far to the side of the
debtor as it is going to swing in the near future. The political com-
plexion of the Supreme Court has changed in the past two years. The
concern with individual rights will now, probably, be tempered with a
concern for economic interests.1"6 Hopefully, at least, the status quo
will be maintained.
James David Prendergast*
106. Cf., Howard, Mr. Justice Powell and the Emerging Nixon Majority, 70
MicH. L. REV. 445 (1972); Reid, The Burger Court and the Civil Rights Movement:
The Supreme Court Giveth and the Supreme Court Taketh Away, 3 RUTGERS CAM-
DEN L.J. 410 (1972).
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